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Abstract
This paper bridges two distinct areas of inquiry: the economic theory of the
family and behavioral research on time-inconsistent preferences. Motivated
by anecdotal and survey evidence suggesting that present bias plays a role in
intra-household decision making, we propose a model in which hyperbolic dis-
counting couples engage in home production activities, thereby accumulating
family-specific capital over time. At any given point in time, the gains to con-
tinued marriage depend on the accumulated stock of this capital and a tempo-
rary random shock to match quality. Couples whose match quality deteriorates
may choose to divorce, and this is more likely to happen if past investments
in family-specific capital have been low. We obtain three main sets of results.
First, present-biased preferences induce couples to underinvest in family-specific
capital and to “overdivorce”. Second, sophisticated couples but not naive ones
may choose to enter marriage on terms which make divorce more costly to ob-
tain. Third, the inefficiencies in the behavior of time-inconsistent couples can
be completely undone by means of earnings and divorce taxes that vary over
the marital life-cycle.
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“Of course there are cases where divorce is inevitable. I havent sat
in the courts for 40 years without knowing that there are cases where
it is just as well the parties separated. But it has been obvious to me
that, by and large, a significant proportion of people who separate
wish they had not five years down the line.”—Sir Paul Coleridge
(Former High Court Judge, 9 February 2016)
1. Introduction
With Gary Becker’s path-breaking Treatise on the Family, scholars started
to use economic theory to describe a broad variety of intrahousehold decision
problems. A common thread in the literature that has developed since then
is the argument that the basic dynamics of family life can be explained within
a framework in which family members behave fully rationally over time. Put
differently, it has been routinely assumed that decisions about marriage and
divorce, household production, labor supply, childbearing and childrearing are
made by perfectly foresighted and time-consistent partners.
In a parallel but unrelated development, the last decades have also wit-
nessed the emergence of behavioral research in economics showing that instant
gratification overpowers long-term considerations when individuals make deci-
sions in a dynamic setting (e.g., Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999a).
Economists have coined the notion of time inconsistency to describe this phe-
nomenon. Individuals with time-inconsistent preferences discount the future hy-
perbolically rather than exponentially and therefore make their decisions with a
present bias. Thus, they are unable to consistently follow a utility-maximizing
plan over their lifetime. Today it is well understood how time-inconsistent pref-
erences affect consumption decisions (e.g., Laibson, 1998; Angeletos et al., 2001),
saving for retirement (Diamond and Ko˝szegi, 2003), health behavior (e.g., Gru-
ber and Ko˝szegi, 2004) or performance on work tasks (e.g., Herweg and Mller,
2011), and the policy implications that come with it have received considerable
attention.1
Our paper argues that family decisions can also be expected to be affected
by cognitive biases, including present bias. This is particularly salient in the
context of divorce. At a first casual level, evidence clearly suggest a cognitive
bias in relation to expectations about marital breakups: as noted by Thaler
and Sunstein (2008), there is almost universal over-optimism among newly-wed
couples about their marriage survival chances.2 More directly related to the
incidence of marital breakups, there is evidence that divorce is associated with
1In particular, a lot of thought has gone into understanding the implications of time-
inconsistent preferences for social security schemes (I˙mrohorog˘lu et al., 2003; Schwarz and
Sheshinski, 2007), the optimal design of sin taxes (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2003, 2006; Gruber
and Ko˝szegi, 2004), or uniform saving floors (Malin, 2008).
2See also Baker and Emery, 1993, for evidence showing that couples are overly optimistic
regarding the survival chances of their own marriage, despite correctly assessing the likelihood
of divorce in the population at large.
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Figure 1: Proportion of divorcees among exponential
and hyperbolic discounters. The difference between the
two means is statistically significant at the 5% level.
personality traits that are predictive of short-sighted and impulsive behavior.
Lundberg (2011) in particular notes that the incidence of divorce is related to
low conscientiousness and neuroticism, which have also been shown to be nega-
tively associated with investments in savings and health. Direct evidence linking
divorce to measures of present-biasedness is, however, harder to come by. In
Figure 1, we present some exploratory evidence based on the 2000 Bank of Italy
Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW), which allows us to link a
measure of present-bias—elicited using an experimental matching task—to in-
dividuals’ marital status. The evidence suggests a strong correlation between
present-biasedness and divorce: among exponential discounters, the proportion
of divorcees is 7.5%; in contrast, the share of divorcees among hyperbolic dis-
counters is 56% higher and amounts to 11.7%.3
Arguing more indirectly, the notion that family decisions are made with a
present bias is consistent with stylized facts that cannot be easily reconciled with
standard models. First, social scientists and practitioners have long emphasized
that a substantial fraction of divorced people express regrets about their choice
to separate, even many years later. For example, US surveys conducted in
New Jersey and Minnesota suggest that between 40 and 46 percent of currently
divorced people have at least some regrets about their divorce (Waite et al.,
2002), and studies from the UK and Australia report similar figures (Wolcott
and Hughes, 1999; Medved, 2017).4 Second, in various cultures and religions
3In Appendix A, we provide details on the underlying data and the classification of survey
respondents as exponential and hyperbolic discounters, respectively. There, we also further
explore the results in Figure 1 in a simple regression framework and discuss additional survey
evidence.
4Of course, this evidence has to be treated with some caution, as divorced couples may
romanticize the time of marriage and may undervalue or ignore the problems the marriage has
had. That said, using a sample of couples from the National Survey of Families and Households
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around the world, it is common to observe marriage contracts that include
clauses preventing unrestricted divorces (e.g., the Islamic “mehr”, the Jewish
“ketubah”, or “covenant” marriages). As of yet, mainstream family economics
has not dealt in any systematic way with the possibility that such contracts—by
making it difficult to obtain a divorce—may offer a useful commitment device
for couples. This seems important not least because much of the western world
has recently seen a development in the opposite direction: the introduction of
no-fault divorce substantially facilitated obtaining a divorce.
One of our contributions is to show how one can systematically think about
these issues by looking at family decisions through the lens of a model of dynam-
ically inconsistent household behavior. Moreover, we argue that this perspective
generates a novel efficiency rational for family-related policy interventions, es-
pecially regarding measures regulating marriage and divorce. Indeed, although
it has been recognized that a household can exhibit dynamically inefficient be-
havior when the decisions that family members take influence the household’s
balance of power with a time lag (e.g., Konrad and Lommerud, 2000; Lundberg
and Pollak, 2003; Basu, 2006; Rasul, 2006; Mazzocco, 2007), the policy impli-
cations of behavioral distortions arising from present bias have not yet been
explored.
At a general level, we envisage a setting in which hyperbolic-discounting
couples engage in household production activities, thereby accumulating family-
specific capital over time. The example of family-specific capital we have in mind
are children, and so our notion of household production centers around the re-
peated choice how to allocate time between parental investments in children and
working in the labour market. Couples are periodically exposed to a shock to
match quality. Couples whose match quality deteriorates may choose to divorce,
and this is more likely to happen if past investments in family-specific capital
have been low. We view children as pure household public goods when parents
are married. However, once a couple divorce, their children become an impure
public good in that one or both parents will no longer be able to fully enjoy
the value of the time investments. Married spouses make their resource allo-
cation choices cooperatively whereas once divorced they act non-cooperatively.
Eventually the children leave the parental home and the couple’s investments
in family-specific capital cease.
In our main model, married partners jointly have time-inconsistent prefer-
ences and act like an entity. We make this “unitary” simplification in order
to highlight the impact of present-bias on the interplay between family-specific
investments and marital stability in the cleanest possible fashion. In particu-
lar, the forces we highlight would also show up in alternative model specifica-
who were all self-reported unhappily married and shared comparable demographic character-
istics, Waite et al. show that those who divorced or separated achieved lower subsequent
psychological well-being—as measured by higher rates of depressive symptoms and alcohol
use—than those who did not. If the within-marriage level of (un)happiness was homogenous
within the sample, this would be inconsistent with divorce decisions being Pareto efficient and
would be consistent with frequent feelings of divorce-regret.
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tions, but most conceivable alternative approaches would give rise to additional
sources of inefficiencies that we want to abstract away from. Examples in-
clude free-riding or “commons” problems in non-cooperative household models
(Konrad and Lommerud, 1995; Hertzberg, 2016), limited commitment problems
(Lommerud, 1989; Lundberg and Pollak, 2003; Mazzocco, 2007), and preference
heterogeneity (Jackson and Yariv, 2015).5 As a robustness check, we provide
a brief analysis of non-cooperative behaviour in Section 8, where we highlight
which results rely on the “unitary” assumptions adopted in the main model.
Our main theoretical results are derived from a stylized three-period model.
In the first period, married couples decide how to allocate their time between
household production and working in the labor market. At the beginning of
the second period, each couple is exposed to a match quality shock and decide
whether to continue marriage or to divorce. They then once again allocate their
time between labor market activities and home production. In the third period,
no household production takes place, but individuals still benefit from the stock
of previously accumulated family-specific capital. In this setting, we compare
the laissez-faire allocation with the first-best choices. In characterizing the first-
best, we follow O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006) and treat individuals’ preference
for short-term gratification as an error. Several important insights follow from
this comparison; here we mention three. First, a present-biased couple termi-
nate their marriage for a larger set of match quality realizations than would be
optimal (i.e., they “overdivorce”). Why is that the case? Present-biasedness
implies that they overreact to negative temporary match quality shocks as they
place too little weight on the value of continued marriage in terms of its positive
impact on future investments in and enjoyment of family-specific capital. Sec-
ond, time-inconsistent preferences induce a procrastination problem in which
couples ex-ante underinvest in family-specific capital, a result that holds for
both sophisticated and naive couples. Third, sophisticated married couples on
the one hand recognize their tendency to over-divorce in the future and that
this distortion can be mitigated by increasing their current investments; this
gives them a strategic investment incentive. Naive married couples on the other
hand hold overly optimistic beliefs about their future marriage survival chances
and hence also about their future enjoyment of any current investments; this
over-optimism bias mitigates their underinvestment. If the over-optimism bias
of naive couples dominates the incentive effect of sophisticated couples, then the
former will invest more in family-specific capital than they latter. This provides
an analogy to the findings of Herweg and Mller (2011), who show that being
aware of one’s own self-control problems may reduce a persons performance on
a task.
We further show that sophisticated couples – but not naive ones – would
5Besides being a simplification, our assumption of homogeneity of time preferences between
spouses is not necessarily unrealistic. For example, a recent empirical study by Arrondel and
Fre´meaux (2016) shows that spouses are, due to marital sorting, very similar in their savings
preferences, even when individual characteristics are controlled for.
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like to have a commitment device preventing them from obtaining a divorce
“too easily”. Various cultures and religions around the world do offer versions
of such commitment devices. In the US, the so-called “covenant” marriage has
been a legally distinct kind of marriage in Louisiana, Arkansas and Arizona
since the 1990s. The marrying spouses agree to sign a statement declaring that
a covenant marriage is for life. They voluntarily choose to limit the grounds
for divorce to adultery, felony and abuse (Spaht, 1998). If one of the spouses
desires a divorce, the couple is first required to attend marital counseling. Thus,
divorce becomes a costly option. Muslim marriages also feature a commitment
device in the form of the so-called “mehr”. A mehr is composed of two parts:
the “muqaddam” which is paid by the groom upon marriage to honor his bride,
and the deferred “mu’akhkhar” component which is paid to the woman in the
event of divorce (Blenkhorn, 2002). The latter makes divorce an expensive en-
deavor for husbands in particular. A very similar role is played the so-called
“ketubah” in the Jewish religion (Hardin, 1988). While standard models of
family decision-making have difficulties in rationalizing why these devices ex-
ist, we show that sophisticated couples may have an incentive to ex-ante opt
for such contracts. In addition, we establish that this incentive is particularly
pronounced in environments in which divorce rate is naturally low.6
The final question we address is: what interventions are necessary to im-
plement the first-best choices? We show that a suitably designed policy can
completely undo the inefficiencies in the behavior of time-inconsistent couples
by means of earnings and divorce taxes that vary over the marital life-cycle.
In our setting, the earnings tax implicitly subsidizes household production; in
each period, it corrects for the share of the future returns of family-specific in-
vestments not internalized by present-biased couples. The divorce tax corrects
for the fact that couples overreact to negative match-quality shocks. In order
to fully understand the properties of the efficiency-restoring policy scheme, we
further report results from a generalized T-period version of the model, cali-
brated to the US economy. This exercise reveals that even a modest degree
of present-bias has a quantitatively important impact on divorce hazards. The
efficiency-restoring divorce tax is an inverted-U function of marriage duration,
reaches its maximum when children are in their teens, and declines thereafter.
The effect of present bias on investments in family-specific capital turns out to
be quantitatively smaller than its impact of divorce decisions, and the efficiency-
restoring earnings tax is relatively flat with respect to marriage duration.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents our stylized three-period model.
Section 3 analyzes sophisticated couples’ family-specific investments and di-
vorce decisions over time. Section 4 characterizes the first-best allocation and
6An alternative argument for why higher divorce costs may be efficiency-enhancing is pro-
vided by limited commitment within marriage to future compensating transfers. This has
recently been explored by Gemici and Laufer (2014) who argue that higher divorce costs may
encourage efficient specialization by married couples. However, based on counterfactual simu-
lations of their estimated model, they conclude that “changing divorce costs does not change
expected lifetime utility substantially” (p. 19).
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describes the inefficiencies arising due to present bias. Section 5 characterizes
privately optimal marriage contracts. How the first-best allocation can be decen-
tralized through policy is described in Section 6. Section 7 contains concluding
remarks. All technical proofs are contained in Appendix B.
2. A Stylized Three-Period Model
We consider a three-period model with time indexed by t = 1, 2, 3. The
economy is populated by men and women, and at the outset of the model, at
t = 1, each individual is exogenously matched with a partner of the opposite
sex. Later on, at t = 2, a given couple may divorce and we then let k = m, d
indicate marital status. In every period, men and women are endowed with one
unit of time which they can allocate between household production and labor
market activity. Time spent in household production allows the couple to build
up their family-specific capital. The example we have in mind is children, and
so our notion of household production centers around parental time investments
in their children.
2.1. Payoffs
Marriage. The utility of a married individual i in period t is given by
umit = x
m
it +G
m
t , (1)
where xmit is the individual’s private consumption and G
m
t is the accumulated
family capital good. We index the partners by i = s, h (for “she” and “he”
respectively). In the second period, the couple are further exposed to a match
quality shock, denoted θ, which enters additively if they stay married. For
simplicity we assume that both partners perceive the match quality shock in
the same way. The shock is assumed to be temporary: it affects the payoffs in
the second period but does not persist into the third period.7 An adverse match
quality shock may, as outlined below, trigger a divorce.
Divorce. A divorced individual’s utility in period t is given by
udit = x
d
it + λiG
d
t . (2)
7The assumption that the partners perceive the match quality shock the same way could
be relaxed to allow for individual shocks. A couple’s divorce decision would then be based
on the sum of the individual match quality shocks. The assumption that the match quality
shock is transitory can also be relaxed to allow it to persist into the final period. With
a pure temporary shock, a present-biased couple place too little weight on the future gain
from continued married relative to the current temporary match quality; in contrast, with a
fully persistent shock, they place a too high relative weight on the current cost of investment
relative to the persisting match quality. The assumption of a pure transitory shock adopted
here makes the results from the three period model directly comparable to the full dynamic
model in Appendix C where it is assumed that a couple experience a temporary shock in every
period.
7
Thus, the payoffs of divorcees differ from those of their married counterparts in
two ways. First, the match quality shock θ becomes irrelevant. Second, partner
i may no longer enjoy the family capital good at a rate of unity but rather at a
rate λi ∈ [0, 1]. For notational convenience, we define Λ ≡ λs + λh and assume
that at least one of the two partners enjoys the family capital good at a lower
rate after divorce, Λ < 2.8
Intertemporal Preferences. Following Laibson (1997), individuals’ intertem-
poral preferences are characterized by (quasi-)hyperbolic discounting also known
as (β, δ)-preferences. The advantage of this preference structure is that it nests
the standard (exponential) discounting model as a special case. An individual’s
intertemporal preferences at time t are represented by
Vit = uit + β
3∑
τ=t+1
δτ−1uiτ , (3)
where δ ∈ [0, 1] represents long-run time-consistent discounting, while β ∈ [0, 1]
is a bias for the present (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999b). The latter reflects
whether the individual is an exponential discounter (β = 1) or a hyperbolic
discounter (β < 1). Hyperbolic discounters have a higher discount rate over
short horizons than over long horizons. Hence, there exists a conflict between
current preferences and those in the future. In particular, for β ∈ (0, 1) the
discount factor between the second and third period is βδ when viewed from the
second period, while it is δ when viewed from the first period. Thus, preferences
are time inconsistent, and individuals face a self-control problem. Individuals
can be either sophisticated or naive. The former foresee their time inconsistency
and undertake steps to manage it while the latter do not perceive their self-
control problem and wrongly expect themselves to behave time consistently in
the future. In our analysis we will concentrate on sophisticated couples. At
the end of Section 4, we will discuss the behavior of naive couples. To simplify
notation, we follow the vast majority of the literature and set δ = 1 in the
three-period model. In our calibration exercise, we use values of δ as suggested
in the literature.
We assume that, while married, a couple behave cooperatively and maximize
their joint intertemporal utility, Vt ≡ Vst+Vht. After they divorce, they act non-
cooperatively, each maximizing his or her own individual intertemporal utility
(see e.g. Weiss and Willis, 1985).
2.2. Timing, Household Production, Earnings and Consumption
Period 1. All couples are married throughout the first period and decide
how to allocate their unit time endowment between household production (gmi1 )
and labor market activity (ℓmi1) in order to maximize their joint intertemporal
8This captures the idea that when parents are divorced, children become impure pub-
lic goods to the extent that neither parent has “full access” to them due to court-imposed
custodial arrangements (see, e.g., Francesconi and Muthoo, 2011).
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utility. A production function v (·, ·) translates the time-inputs in household
production into the family capital good Gm1 . In particular
Gm1 = v (g
m
s1, g
m
h1) . (4)
We assume that v (·, ·) is a strictly increasing and strictly concave, and that
v (0, 0) = 0 and limgi→0 vi (gs, gh) =∞ where vi is the first-order partial deriva-
tive with respect to the input of partner i = s, h. The second-order partial
derivatives are denoted by vij . Our setup allows the spouses’ time inputs to be
either substitutes (vij < 0), independent (vij = 0) or complements (vij > 0).
Period 2. At the beginning of the second period, the couple’s match quality
shock θ is realized, representing a non-economic gain or loss from marriage (see,
e.g., Fan, 2001). We assume that θ is drawn from a distribution F (·) with
support (−∞,∞) and associated density f (·). After θ is realized, the spouses
first decide cooperatively whether to continue their marriage or to divorce. After
that, they decide how to allocate their time. The level of family-specific capital
enjoyed, Gk2 , is that carried forward from the first period, G
m
1 , plus the amount
added through household production in the current period:
Gk2 = G
m
1 + v
(
gks2, g
k
h2
)
for k = m, d. (5)
Note that the level of household production in this period will typically vary
with the couple’s chosen marital status, k = m, d.9 Also note that, due to the
additive specification in (5), the level of household production at t = 2 will be
independent of capital carried forward from t = 1. This not only simplifies the
analysis but also helps ensure continuity of behavior and the existence of an
equilibrium.
Period 3. We assume that divorced individuals cannot remarry and so con-
tinue to live as divorced. We explicitly think of the third period as the stage in
a family’s life cycle when the children have grown up and left home. Hence, we
assume that no further time is devoted to investment in the children. Instead,
individuals spend their entire time endowment on labor market activity. How-
ever, both married and divorced couples continue to benefit from the stock of
family-specific capital accumulated in the first two periods. Thus,
Gk3 = G
k
2 for k = m, d. (6)
Earned Income and Consumption. Partner i’s earnings in period t and mar-
ital state k are given by ykit = ωiℓ
k
it, where ωi is the wage rate. Given that
9In our stylized three-period model, we assume for simplicity that the family capital good
is perfectly durable. However, our results would qualitatively also go through in a richer
specification with a quasi-durable family public good which is subject to some positive rate
of depreciation. The extended version of our model presented in Appendix C allows for
such capital depreciation. The additive form in (5) also assumes perfect substitutability
between additions to the family capital stock at different times. We comment further on this
assumption below.
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a couple, while married, maximize their joint utility with each partner’s util-
ity being linear in consumption, the exact sharing rule within marriage has no
bearing on the current problem and can be left unspecified. How consumption
is shared after divorce, when the couple act non-cooperatively, however does
matter. Hence we assume that partner i enjoys a share ϕi of the couple’s total
earnings, whereby ϕs + ϕh = 1. These shares can be interpreted as determined
by the legal environment regulating divorce. We will further assume, for reasons
that will become clear below, that each partner’s consumption share matches
his or her share of joint utility of the family capital good post divorce.
Partner i’s consumption level as divorce can then be written as
xdit = ϕi
∑
j=s,h
ydjt, (7)
with
ϕi =
λi
Λ
. (8)
A leading case is where the woman has, due to custody arrangements, a higher
post-divorce enjoyment of the accumulated household public good and also,
through child support arrangements, enjoys the larger share of joint income.
3. Laissez-Faire Allocation
We begin by characterizing the equilibrium with sophisticated behavior.
Period 3. As noted above, no decisions have to be taken in the third period.
The couple’s joint instantaneous utility in the married state and the individual
utility in the divorced state are given by
um3 =
∑
j=s,h
ωj + 2G
m
3 , and u
d
i3 = ϕi
∑
j=s,h
ωj + λiG
d
3, (9)
respectively, with Gk3 given by eq. (6).
Period 2. At the beginning of the second period the temporary match quality
shock θ is realized and a couple first of all have to decide wether to stay married
or to divorce. However, as the gain to marriage also depends on the time
allocations made in the second period, we first consider these choices, both
within marriage and after divorce.
The joint instantaneous utility as married is given by
um2 =
∑
j=s,h
ωj
(
1− gmj2
)
+ 2Gm2 + 2θ, (10)
where Gm2 is defined in eq. (5). The couple maximize their joint intertemporal
utility from marriage, um2 + βu
m
3 , where u
m
3 and u
m
2 are defined in eqs. (9) and
(10), respectively. The chosen time allocation, denoted (gˆms2, gˆ
m
h2), is the unique
solution to the following first-order conditions:
ωi
vi (gˆms2, gˆ
m
h2)
= 2 (1 + β) for i = s, h. (11)
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Thus, the marginal cost of each partner adding a further unit of family capital
– the left hand side – is set equal to the joint marginal return, where the latter
includes the current and discounted future marginal utility to each partner.
The instantaneous utility of partner i as divorced is given by
udi2 = ϕi
∑
j=s,h
ωj
(
1− gdj2
)
+ λiG
d
2. (12)
As noted above, divorced partners act non-cooperatively, with partner i max-
imizing his/her own intertemporal utility, udi2 + βu
d
i3, where u
d
i3 and u
d
i2 are
defined in eqs. (9) and (12), respectively. The Nash equilibrium time allocation
choices of the divorced spouses, denoted
(
gˆds2, gˆ
d
h2
)
, are the unique solution to
the following first-order conditions:
ωi
vi
(
gˆds2, gˆ
d
h2
) = λi
ϕi
(1 + β) for i = s, h. (13)
Our assumption in eq. (8) ensures that the time allocation choices of divorced
spouses coincide with that which would maximize their joint intertemporal
utility. This allows us to abstract away from inefficiencies arising from non-
cooperative post-divorce behavior when analyzing optimal policy design. It also
implies that in either marital state, the equilibrium level of household produc-
tion is produced at the lowest possible cost in terms of total foregone earnings.
It turns out to be convenient to define the difference in equilibrium foregone
earnings across the two marital states as:
Cˆ2 ≡
∑
i=s,h
ωi
(
gˆmi2 − gˆdi2
)
. (14)
As a basis for our subsequent analysis, it is also useful to compare the level
of family-specific capital generated through household production in the two
possible marital states:
Lemma 1. For any given level of Gm1 , a couple choose a higher level of house-
hold production at t = 2 if they remain married than if they divorce: v (gˆms2, gˆ
m
h2) >
v
(
gˆds2, gˆ
d
h2
)
> 0. Thus, they also forego more earnings: Cˆ2 > 0.
Consider next the couple’s decision whether to remain married or to divorce.
This decision takes place after the realization of θ but before they choose how
to allocate their time. A couple will divorce if doing so gives them a larger joint
intertemporal utility than remaining married. Thus, a divorce occurs if
uˆm2 + βuˆ
m
3 < uˆ
d
2 + βuˆ
d
3, (15)
where the uˆmt ’s are instantaneous joint utilities, within marriage, evaluated at
gˆms2 and gˆ
m
h2, and where uˆ
d
t is similarly defined as the instantaneous joint utilities,
as divorced, evaluated at gˆds2 and gˆ
d
h2. Naturally, the couple will divorce if their
match quality shock is sufficiently unfavourable. In particular, substituting
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using eqs. (9), (10) and (12), shows that the couple will divorce if θ falls below
a threshold value, denoted θˆ (Gm1 ), the value of which will depend on the level
of family-specific capital carried forward from the initial period:
θˆ (Gm1 ) ≡ Cˆ2/2− (1 + β)
[
Gˆm2 − (Λ/2) Gˆd2
]
, (16)
where Gˆk2 = G
m
1 + v
(
gˆks2, gˆ
k
h2
)
. It is straightforward to establish that θˆ (Gm1 ) is
a decreasing function of Gm1 :
θˆ′ (Gm1 ) = − (1 + β) (1− Λ/2) < 0. (17)
From the perspective of the first period, the probability of divorce, which can
be written as F (θˆ(Gm1 )), is thus endogenous since it decreases with the family-
specific capital the couple accumulates in that period.
Period 1. The partner’s instantaneous joint utility in the first period is given
by
um1 =
∑
j=s,h
ωj
(
1− gmj1
)
+ 2Gm1 , (18)
where Gm1 is given by eq. (4). The couple choose their time allocation to
maximize their joint intertemporal utility,
V1 = u
m
1 + β
{
Eθ
(
uˆm2 + uˆ
m
3
∣∣θ > θˆ) [1− F (θˆ)]+ (uˆd2 + uˆd3)F (θˆ)
}
, (19)
correctly anticipating their own future behavior, and where θˆ = θˆ(Gm1 ) and Eθ
is the expectations operator, with expectations taken over θ. The first term
in the curly brackets reflects a couple’s continuation value upon entering the
second period conditional on the marriage surviving and the second term is the
corresponding value conditional on divorcing.
Lemma 2. The time allocation chosen by a couple at t = 1, denoted (gˆms1, gˆ
m
h1),
is the unique solution to the following first-order conditions:
ωi
vi (gˆms1, gˆ
m
h1)
= 2 + 2β
{
2− (2− Λ)
[
F (θˆ)− χf(θˆ)
]}
for i = s, h, (20)
where θˆ = θˆ(Gˆm1 ) defined as in eq. (16) with Gˆ
m
1 = v (gˆ
m
s1, gˆ
m
h1), and where
χ ≡
(
1− β2) (Gˆm2 − (Λ/2) Gˆd2)
2
> 0, (21)
with Gˆk2 = Gˆ
m
1 + v
(
gˆks2, gˆ
k
h2
)
for k = m, d.
Decomposing eq. (20) reveals that a couple has five sources of (dis)incentives
to invest time in the family capital good. First, an increase in Gm1 increases a
couple’s joint lifetime benefits from family-specific capital conditional on the
marriage remaining intact in the second period. This acts as an incentive to
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make family-specific investments and is given by 2 (1 + 2β). Second, the lowered
enjoyment of the capital good in the case of divorce acts as a disincentive to
invest and is captured by −2β (2− Λ)F (θˆ).
Third, an increased accumulation of family capital good in the first period
expands downwards the set of match quality shocks at which they choose to re-
main married in the second period, thereby lowering the expected match quality.
This “marital quality effect” acts as a disincentive to invest in the family cap-
ital good and is given by −2βθˆf(θˆ)θˆ′. Fourth, counteracting this effect is the
direct utility gain that comes with an increase in the probability of the mar-
riage remaining intact. This “endogenous divorce effect” increases incentives to
make family-specific investments and is given by −βf(θˆ)θˆ′[2(2Gˆm2 −ΛGˆd2)−Cˆ2].
Subtracting the marital quality effect from the endogenous divorce effect using
the expressions for θˆ and θˆ′ derived in eqs. (16)-(17), we have
2β (2− Λ)χf(θˆ) > 0. (22)
In words, given that the couple are present-biased, the positive “endogenous
divorce effect” dominates the negative “marital quality effect”. For reasons
that will become clear shortly, we will refer to this term as the “sophistication
effect”. Note that this effect would vanish in the absence of present bias: β → 1
implies χ→ 0.
Finally, as before, the left hand side captures the marginal cost of generating
an additional unit of the family-specific capital through an increase in the time
input into household production by partner i.
4. First-Best Allocation and Inefficiency of Laissez-Faire under Present-
Bias
We follow O’Donoghue and Rabin (2006) and treat individuals’ preference for
short-term gratification as an error, leading to a self-control problem when β <
1. When viewed from an ex ante perspective, the first-best allocation maximizes
the exponentially discounted joint expected utilities. Since the structure of the
problem remains the same, but with β set to unity throughout, we can directly
summarize a couple’s efficient behavior. In the second period, the first-best time
allocations by marital status k = m, d, denoted
(
g˜ks2, g˜
k
h2
)
, satisfy
ωi
vi
(
g˜ks2, g˜
k
h2
) =
{
4 if k = m
2Λ if k = d
for i = s, h. (23)
The efficient match quality threshold, given an arbitrary Gm1 , satisfies
θ˜ (Gm1 ) ≡ C˜2/2− 2
[
G˜m2 − (Λ/2) G˜d2
]
, (24)
where C˜2 =
∑
i=s,h ωi
(
g˜mi2 − g˜di2
)
and G˜k2 = G
m
1 + v
(
g˜ks2, g˜
k
h2
)
.
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In the initial period, a couple’s first-best time allocation, denoted (g˜ms1, g˜
m
h1),
is the unique solution to:
ωi
vi (g˜ms1, g˜
m
h1)
= 6− 2 (2− Λ)F (θ˜) for i = s, h, (25)
where θ˜ = θ˜(G˜m1 ) with G˜
m
1 = v(g˜
m
s1, g˜
m
h1). Thus, the probability of divorce in
the first-best allocation can be written as F (θ˜(G˜m1 )).
How does a bias for the present distort a couple’s behavior as compared to
the first-best choices that would have maximized their exponentially discounted
joint intertemporal utility? Consider first a couple’s second-period choices. The
following result holds globally for any degree of present bias (i.e. for any β < 1):
Proposition 1 (Second-Period Choices). For any given level of Gm1 , a present
bias causes a couple at t = 2 to:
(a) choose an inefficiently low level of household production in each marital
state: v
(
gˆks2, gˆ
k
h2
)
< v
(
g˜ks2, g˜
k
h2
)
for k = m, d.
(b) “over-divorce”—i.e., to break up for a larger set of match quality realiza-
tions than in the first-best allocation: θˆ (Gm1 ) > θ˜ (G
m
1 ) .
That present-biasedness causes a couple to underinvest in the family-specific
capital is hardly surprising given that they place too little weight on its future
benefits. Perhaps more interesting is the over-divorcing result. On the one hand,
divorce has two “short-term gratification” components: it allows the couple to
avoid a temporary unfavorable match quality shock and they can enjoy more
current consumption as they will forego less earnings to produce the household
capital good. On the other hand, divorce has two “long-term” effects, the payoff
consequences of which persist into the final period: it reduces the amount of
family-specific capital that the couple accumulate and it also reduces their total
enjoyment from their family capital good. Present-biased couples “over-divorce”
because they overreact to the short-term gratification components of divorce
relative to the two permanent effects.10
The impact of present bias on a couple’s first-period investment is less obvi-
ous. Two opposing effects can be identified. As in the second period, a present
bias directly causes the couple place too little weight on future relative to cur-
rent payoffs which generates a tendency for underinvestment. However, being
sophisticated, the couple are aware that their present bias will make them too
prone to divorce in the following period. This provides them with a strategic
investment motive: by investing more in the first period, they can reduce their
divorce risk in the second period. Formally, the strategic investment motive
10The results in Proposition 1 continue to hold with capital depreciation between periods
as long as the depreciation is not complete.
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is captured by the sophistication effect in eq. (22) which is not present in the
first-order condition characterizing the efficient investment level.11
We now ask whether the direct present bias effect dominates the sophistica-
tion effect or vice versa. In order to derive a clear-cut result, we will consider
how the introduction of present bias into the couples’ preferences – that is,
a marginal reduction in β away from unity – affects the level of first-period
household production.
Proposition 2 (First-Period Household Production). At t = 1, the in-
troduction of present bias causes a couple to choose an inefficiently low level of
household production: v (gˆms1, gˆ
m
h1) < v
(
g˜ks1, g˜
k
h1
)
.
Thus, the introduction of present bias will cause couples to exit the first
period with an inefficiently low level of family-specific capital. A present bias
therefore increases the equilibrium divorce risk through two channels: it does
so directly by making the couple more prone to divorce for any given level
of family capital, and also indirectly by reducing the accumulation of family-
specific capital in the initial period.
One caveat is that the above result is only a “local” one as β is arbitrarily
close to unity. There are sufficient conditions under which the result can be
generalized to hold for any degree of present bias. One particularly simple
condition concerns the probability density function f :
Corollary 1. Suppose that the match quality shock θ is drawn from a uniform
probability density function: θ ∼ U(θ, θ). At t = 1, a couple will then choose an
inefficiently low level of household production for any degree of present bias.
The results above have naturally been stated in terms of a couple’s total
level of household production rather than in terms of the spouses’ individual
time inputs. As noted earlier, for any chosen level of household production, the
spouses’ time inputs minimize the cost in terms of total foregone earnings.12
This means that, as long as neither partner’s time is an “inferior” input, state-
ments on the levels of household production carry over to individual time inputs.
Neither partner’s time input can be inferior if the household production func-
tion either exhibits complementarity or independence (i.e., when υsh ≥ 0). If
the time inputs are substitutes (i.e., when vsh < 0), one partner’s time input
may be inferior.
11As noted above, we have assumed that there are no complementarities between invest-
ments across time. The possibility of such complementarities has received some attention
in the literature (e.g. Cunha and Heckman, 2007). Any such complementarities could also
generate strategic incentives for early investments. For instance, a couple may strategically
invest in the human capital of a very young child in order to raise the marginal return to
investment – and hence their own future investment – in the child’s human capital at a higher
age.
12Note that this holds not only in marriage, but also after divorce due to the assumption
in eq. (8).
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So far, we have focused on sophisticated behavior by couples who are aware
of their self-control problem. The literature contrasts this to naive behavior
by individuals who – at any moment in time – acts on a preference for instant
gratification, but fail to foresee that they will do so in the future.
Both sophisticated and naive couples will tend to underinvest in the family
capital due to their preferences for instant gratification. However, it is not
immediately clear whether the investment behaviour of naive couples will be
more or less inefficient than that of sophisticated couples.
To see this, note that there are two implications of sophistication. On the one
hand, the strategic incentive effect means that a sophisticated couple will invest
in part in order to reduce their own future propensity to divorce. On the other
hand, there is a pessimism effect stemming from their correct expectation.13
The pessimism of a sophisticated couple has to be understood in relation
to the divorce expectation of a naive couple. To see this, note that for any
given Gm1 built up in the first period, a naive couple will expect themselves
to make an efficient divorce decision in the following period, thus expecting to
divorce at rate F (θ˜(Gm1 )). However, when the second period arrives they will
divorce at the higher rate F (θˆ(Gm1 )).
14 Hence the naive couple will naturally
be over-optimistic about their marriage survival chances, and they therefore
perceive a larger marginal value to investment. Indeed, the first order condition
characterizing the initial period investment by a naive couple, denoted (g¯ms1, g¯
m
h1),
can be written as
ωi
vi (g¯ms1, g¯
m
h1)
= 2 + 2β
[
2− (2− Λ)F
(
θ˜
(
G¯m1
))]
for i = s, h, (26)
where G¯m1 = v (g¯
m
s1, g¯
m
h1). Comparing (26) to (25) we see that the presence of the
present-bias factor β implies that the naive couple will under-invest relative to
the first best. However, whether the optimism-bias of a naive couple is stronger
or weaker than the incentive effect of a sophisticated couple—i.e., whether the
former type of couple invest more than the latter in the initial period—is a
priori not clear. The following result provides a condition that separates the
two possibilities.
Proposition 3 (Naivity v. Sophistication). At t = 1, a naive couple will
choose a higher (lower) level of household production than a sophisticated couple
if and only if
F (θˆ)− F (θ¯)
θˆ − θ¯
> (<)κf(θˆ), (27)
13The notion that sophistication brings often couteracting incentive- and pessimism-effects
is known in the literature (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2002), particularly from the context of
addiction where consumption decisions are inter-temporally linked. In our context, the effects
arise since the initial investment decision is linked to the future divorce decision.
14They will also expect themselves to invest
(
g˜k
s2
, g˜k
h2
)
in marital state k = m,d whereas,
when period 2 actually arrives, they will invest
(
gˆk
s2
, gˆk
h2
)
.
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where κ ≃ (1 + β) /2 ≤ 1.
This result has an intuitive explanation. On the one hand, if f(θˆ) is large,
an increase in Gm1 leads to a large increase in the equilibrium marriage survival
rate, implying a strong strategic investment motive for a sophisticated couple.
The left hand side of eq. (27), on the other hand, effectively measures the rate
at which a naive couple’s misperception of their own future divorce behaviour
generates marriage survival optimism which, if large, implies a large optimism
bias.
In practice, the left hand side of eq. (27) is, to a first order approximation,
equal to f(θˆ) and, for modest present bias (β close to unity) κ will also be close
to unity. This suggests that the investment behaviour of naive and sophisticated
couple can be expected to be similar, which has been confirmed in numerical
examples.
5. Privately Optimal Marriage Contracts
In the Introduction we highlighted how, in various cultures and religions
around the world, couples enter into marriage on contractual terms that make
divorce a costly option. While standard models of household behavior have
difficulties in rationalizing this type of marriage contracts, our theory suggests
that couples who expect themselves to behave with a present bias may find them
privately optimal. To see this, we now add an additional ex ante stage, t = 0,
to the model.
We will think of this ex ante stage as the time of marriage, before any family
investments commence, and we will explore if a marrying couple can be made
better off with a marital contract obliging them to pay a positive monetary
penalty ζ in the event of divorce. Framed differently, we may also think of a
society deciding on opting for legislation that makes divorce more costly. The
remainder of the game then follows the same structure as in the baseline model,
but now includes the divorce penalty.
Consider the couple’s joint intertemporal utility as viewed from the ex ante
stage when a divorce penalty ζ is in operation. This can be written as:
V0 = β
{
uˆm1 +
[
Eθ
(
uˆm2 + uˆ
m
3
∣∣θ > θˆ) [1− F (θˆ)]+ (uˆd2 − ζ + uˆd3)F (θˆ)]} ,
(28)
and where the match quality threshold level θˆ depends on ζ not only directly
but also indirectly via its impact on the couple’s choice of first period level of
household production. We will assume that a couple responds to the introduc-
tion of positive divorce penalty by increasing their first period level of household
production, ∂Gˆm1 /∂ζ
∣∣
ζ=0
> 0. This can be shown to hold for the case of a uni-
formly distributed match quality θ ∼ U(θ, θ), but can also be expected to hold
much more generally. We then obtain:
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Figure 2: A Welfare Improving Divorce Penalty
Proposition 4 (Welfare-Improving Divorce Penalty). If
F (θˆ) <
2
{[
2 + (2− Λ) f(θˆ)χ
] (
1− β2) ∂Gˆm1
∂ζ
∣∣∣
ζ=0
+ χf(θˆ)
}
(1 + β)
[
1 + 2 (2− Λ) (1− β) ∂Gˆm1
∂ζ
∣∣∣
ζ=0
] (29)
holds at the laissez-faire equilibrium, then introducing a positive divorce penalty
ζ > 0 into the marriage contract will increase the couple’s joint ex ante expected
utility.
The following provides an intuition. The introduction of a divorce penalty
mitigates the over-divorce distortion in the second period as well as the extent
of underinvestment in the first period, thus modifying a present-biased couple’s
behavior in the efficient direction.15 However, a divorce penalty also comes with
a first-order cost effect which is proportional to the risk of divorce. Hence, if β is
only marginally below unity, a divorce penalty cannot improve a couples’ ex-ante
utility as their behavior is already close to efficient, implying that the first-order
cost effect dominates.16 But if the degree of present bias is more substantial
and the baseline divorce risk is low, the impact of the divorce penalty on future
behavior can dominate the cost effect.
This is illustrated in Figure 1 based on a model specification that gives rise
to closed form solutions. In particular, it is assumed that θ ∼ U(−2, 0) and that
15Note that when, when ζ = 0, V0 is proportional to the joint utility that is maximized by
the efficient allocation.
16Formally, in the limit where β → 1, the right hand side of (29) goes to zero. To see this,
recall that χ also goes to zero, see eq. (21).
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the household production function is given by v (gst, ght) =
√
gst+
√
ght. Under
this assumption, the cost of achieving a level of household production v can be
written as C(v) = 12ξv
2, where ξ is an increasing function of ωs and ωh.
In Panel A, we set β = 0.95, and then examine couples’ incentives to accept a
divorce penalty as part of their marital contract in the (Λ, ξ)-space.17 There are
three regions to consider. Region I is irrelevant for the purpose of our analysis,
in that for parameter values in this region the equilibrium divorce rate is zero.
In Region II, the efficiency-enhancing effect of a divorce penalty dominates the
first-order cost effect. Thus, it will be privately optimal for couples to accept
a marriage contract making divorce a costly option. Notice that Region II
represents parameter values for which the equilibrium divorce rate is relatively
low. Put differently, the gains from marriage over divorce are relatively large,
either because the opportunity cost of home production is low, or because the
rate at which couples can enjoy the family capital good after a divorce is low.
For (Λ, ξ)-combinations in Region III, the equilibrium divorce rate is larger. As
a consequence, the efficiency-enhancing effect of a divorce penalty is too small
relative to the first-order cost effect, and couples are better off to leave divorce
as costless option. Panel B presents results for a comparative-statics exercise in
which the degree of present bias is lowered. As would be expected, this has the
effect of reducing the set parameter values under which couples benefit from a
divorce penalty.
Overall, the main message here is that present-biased couples may have an
incentive to make divorce a costly option, and that this incentive is particularly
pronounced in environments in which the equilibrium divorce rate is naturally
low.
6. Efficiency-Restoring Policy
A marital contract that involves a divorce cost may allow a present-biased
couple to get closer to their first-best behavior, but will not achieve full effi-
ciency. We now show that full efficiency can be restored through policy provided
there is a sufficient set of policy instruments.18
6.1. Policy in the Three-Period Model
The instruments required directly correspond to the decisions taken by a
couple over the course of their marital lifecycle, most notably their time alloca-
tions and potential divorce decision. Hence let τt be a proportional tax on labor
17We will use the same time preference parameters in the extended model developed in
Appendix C and discussed in Section 6.
18While we focus here on policy that restores full efficiency based on long-run exponentially
discounted preferences, it should be noted that sophisticated couples would support some form
of policy also based on their preferences as of t = 1 when they are β-discounting the future.
For instance it is straightforward to verify that a sophisticated couple at t = 1, recognizing
their future tendency to over-divorce, would support the introduction of divorce fee at t = 2
with the expected revenue from that fee returned in lump-sum fashion at the beginning of
that period.
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earnings in period t, and let η be a divorce tax payable by a couple who choose
to divorce. All expected tax proceeds are given to the couple as a lump-sum
transfer at the outset of each period, before the couple take any decisions. We
then have the following:
Proposition 5 (Efficiency-Restoring Policy). The first-best allocation can
be implemented by a policy scheme with the following elements:
(a) At t = 2, there are taxes on labor earnings and on divorce given by:
τˆ2 =
(1− β)
2
and ηˆ = (1− β)
[
2G˜m2 − ΛG˜d2 − C˜2/2
]
, (30)
where G˜k2 = G˜
m
1 + v
(
g˜ks2, g˜
k
h2
)
and C˜2 =
∑
i=s,h ωi
(
g˜mi2 − g˜di2
)
.
(b) At t = 1, there is a tax on labor earnings given by:
τˆ1 =
2 (1− β)
[
2− (2− Λ)F (θ˜)
]
6− 2 (2− Λ)F (θ˜) . (31)
A number of points are worth noting. First, the efficiency-restoring earnings
tax is gender-neutral: even if spouses differ in their labor market and household
productivities, they face the same tax rate on their earnings at any moment in
time. Second, the earnings tax τˆt that the couple face when married varies over
time, and it does so for two reasons. On the one hand, family investments made
in the first period are enjoyed over a longer time horizon than those made in
the second period. On the other hand, they are made under the risk of future
divorce. The earnings tax τˆ2 is here also independent of marital status; this
is due to the assumption of a zero divorce risk in the final period. Third, in
the current three period model, a couple only face a divorce decision once. In
a more general environment the divorce tax ηˆ will also be marriage-duration
dependent. Fourth, while our focus is on an efficiency-restoring policy, even a
non-optimal policy can be welfare-improving. For instance, the introduction of
a divorce fee η on its own can improve the welfare of a sophisticated couple.
The logic follows the case of privately imposed divorce costs, noting that the
lump-sum return of the expected proceeds from the fee removes the expected
cost to the couple.
6.2. An Extended Calibrated Model
To gain further insight into the potential magnitudes of the distortions gen-
erated by present bias and of the tax policies required to restore efficiency the
model can usefully be extended to a longer horizon. Here we report some basic
insights from an extension to T = 40 periods starting at the time of marriage,
with investments occuring in the first T0 = 20 periods.
19 T was chosen to cap-
ture the time between average age at first marriage in the US which is about
19The details of the extended model are presented in Appendix C.
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27 for women and 29 for men in the latest statistics (US Census Bureau) and
retirement age, while T0 was chosen to correspond to the average age at which
children leave full time education (OECD, 2008).
To calibrate the model to the US economy, we then use a combination of
parameter estimates from the literature and a set of key empirical stylized facts
that we match. The latter set includes inter alia (i) the percent of marriages
still intact after 10 periods (68 percent according to Copen et al., 2012), (ii) the
gender pay ratio (82 percent according to BLS, 2014), (iii) fraction of available
time allocated to labour market work by married men and women respectively
(set at 67 and 36 percent respectively)20, (iv) the impact of children growing up
and moving out on divorce hazard (an increase of 75 percent following Hiede-
mann, Suhomlinova and O’Rand, 1998, and Walker and Zhu, 2004), and (v) the
impact of divorce on children’s outcomes (set at 15 percent following Piketty,
2003, Gruber, 2004, and Bjo¨rklund and Sundstro¨m, 2006).21
The calibration highlights two key features in particular. First, while it
was argued above that the tax on earnings will vary with marriage duration,
in practice this duration-dependence is negligible. The reason is simple: since
the couple’s full horizon T extends well beyond their investment phase T0, the
variation in horizon within the investment phase plays a minor role. Indeed,
both within marriage and after divorce, the efficiency-restoring tax on earnings
is essentially flat over time and close to (1− β) γδ (where γ is the capital carry-
forward rate). This is illustrated in the left panel of Figure 3 which plots
the efficiency-restoring earnings tax by marital status over the T0 years of the
investment phase, with the red line indicating the value of (1− β) γδ.
Second, the calibrated model shows that even a level of present-bias, β =
0.95, that is modest from the perspective of the literature can generate a sub-
stantial increase in the incidence of divorce: in the calibrated model the fraction
of couples that divorce within 10 years is increased by a about a third relative
to the efficient fraction. This marked impact on divorce behavior also implies
a more substantial and strongly time-varying efficiency-restoring divorce tax.
Indeed, we find that the efficient divorce tax, illustrated in the right panel of
Figure 3, is inverted U-shaped and is at its largest during the children’s early
teenage years. At that stage we find that the efficiency-restoring divorce tax
corresponds to about 10 percent of the annual earnings of a married couple.
It should be noted that the model is calibrated without any direct divorce
costs beyond η. In practice divorce costs can be substantial. Indeed, for the US,
many sources estimate the average cost of divorcing ranges from less than $1,000
for uncontested divorce to $15,000 for divorces involving mediation and/or liti-
20This follows figures from the the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS, 2014) and the American
Time Use Survey (ATUS, 2014)
21The parameter values obtained from the literature includes (i) the discount rate δ, set
at 0.95 following Prescott (1986) and others, (ii) the present-bias parameter β, set at 0.95
following Augenblick, Niederle and Sprenger (2013) and Andreoni and Sprenger (2012), and
(iii) a capital depreciation rate, 1−γ, set at 2.5 percent following Manuelli, Seshadri and Shin
(2012).
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Figure 3: Efficiency-restoring earnings and divorce taxes by marriage duration.
gation.22. In contrast, average household income for married couples (under age
65) is around $120,000 (Table HINC-02, US Census Bureau, 2016). This sug-
gests that actual divorce cost may potentially come close the efficiency-restoring
divorce fees, and may even exceed these for couples who are either at the initial
or final stages of their investment phase.
Overall, the results presented here provide a new perspective for research
into the optimal taxation of couples. The existing literature has mainly focused
on the design of gender-specific tax schedules (e.g., Boskin and Sheshinski, 1983;
Alesina et al., 2011; Immervoll et al., 2011; Meier and Rainer, 2015). A conven-
tional result that emerges from these studies is that the spouse with the higher
labor supply elasticity – typically the secondary earner – should be taxed at
a lower rate. With time-inconsistent couples, there will be additional drivers
in the design of optimal income tax schedules that call for potentially gender-
neutral but marital-life-cycle-dependent earnings taxes for married spouses.
7. The Role of Cooperative Behavior
What role does the assumption of cooperative household behavior, which
implies that couples act like an entity, play for our results? Fundamentally, it
22See e.g. http://www.divorcestatistics.info or https://www.huffingtonpost.com/cheryl-
and-joe-dillon/how-much-does-divorce-cos b 6143024.html.
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ensures that a couple internalize any external effects onto each other that arise
from their investment and divorce decisions. In Appendix D, we show what
would be the implications of replacing the assumption of cooperative behavior
with a basic non-cooperative Nash equilibrium assumption.
There would be two key implications. First, the model effectively becomes
one of private contributions to a public good (Bergstrom et al., 1986). Hence
each partner tends to devote inefficiently little time to investing in the house-
hold public good as he/she neglects the benefit to the partner. Second, even
with a commonly experienced match quality shock θ, the partners will gener-
ally not agree on the divorce decision. Assuming a unilateral divorce regime,
the marriage will continue if and only if both partners prefer this to divorce.
Hence, in equilibrium, one partner will effectively be “decisive” with respect to
this decision, and any strategic investments—by either partner—will focus on
strengthening the decisive partner’s incentives to remain married.
In terms of policy, the public good aspect of the private investments will
generally motivate a base earnings tax rate of 1/2 in any period and state
where investments are made. The exact efficiency-restoring tax rate at time
t = 2 will further generally be both marital status and gender-dependent (in
the divorced state) except in the case where both spouses enjoy the capital
stock equally after divorce, λs = λh. If λs 6= λh, the spouse with the relatively
lower λ will face the relatively higher efficiency restoring earnings tax rate. The
efficiency-restoring divorce fee will have to be tailored to the incentives of the
decisive spouse, but otherwise has a similar structure to the main model. At
time t = 1 the efficiency-restoring earnings tax rate is generally gender-specific
except under symmetric post-divorce enjoyment of the public good, λs = λh.
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Hence, as expected, non-cooperation introduces further inefficiencies that
need to be corrected by policy. Moreover, asymmetries between the partners
will generally break the gender-neutrality that characterized policy in the main
model.
8. Concluding Remarks
The dominant view among family economists is that the basic dynamics of
household decision-making can be explained within a framework in which family
members behave fully rationally over time. This paper departs from this view
and takes some steps towards connecting the economic theory of the family
with behavioral research on time-inconsistent preferences. At the center of our
story are hyperbolic discounting couples who make two sets of decisions. First,
they engage in home production activities, thereby accumulating family-specific
capital over time. Second, the probability of divorce is endogenously determined
by the level of accumulated family-specific capital itself. We show that present-
biased preferences induce couples to underinvest in family-specific capital and to
23Further gender symmetry is also required with respect to differences in investments across
marital states. See the Appendix for details.
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over-divorce. From a policy perspective, our model gives a sense of how earnings
and divorce taxes that vary of the marital life cycle can undo the inefficiencies
in the behavior of time-inconsistent couples. Moreover, it provides a rationale
for the existence of marriage contracts that serve as barriers to hasty divorces.
We have presented the most parsimonious model we could construct in order
to highlight our main ideas. Thus, our approach leaves open many interesting
directions for future theoretical research. The model assumes that individuals
do not consume leisure, nor does it allow couples to purchase market goods as
substitutes for the their own time input into home production. It would be
interesting to allow for either or both. Another possible extension would be to
recognize the possibility of heterogeneity in time preferences, even with married
couples. Although there is a small literature on joint intertemporal choice in
environments with heterogenous time preferences (Jackson and Yariv, 2015;
Lizzeri and Yariv, 2017), in the household context, it would further raise the
question of how sorting into marriage occurs. Hence such an extension would
be most naturally accompanied by endogenizing marriage formation.
Last but not least, while our contribution is a theoretical exercise, future
work should attempt to assess the empirical relevance of present bias for intra-
household decisions. In this regard, an interesting, albeit difficult, task would
be to formulate an estimable model that allows inferences about the fractions
of time-consistent and time-inconsistent households from observational data.
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Appendix A: Some Correlational Evidence on Present-Biasedness and
Divorce (Intended for Online Publication)
In Figure 1, we have provided some correlational evidence on the link be-
tween present-biasedness and divorce. To that end, we have drawn upon the
2000 Bank of Italy Survey of Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) and fol-
lowed the methodology proposed by Eisenhauer and Ventura (2006) to charac-
terize survey respondents as either hyperbolic or exponential discounters. In
essence, the 2000 SHIW contains two experimental matching tasks in which re-
spondents indicate the amount of an immediate reward that makes it just as
attractive as a larger future reward:
q1 = “Suppose that you were informed that you had won the sum
of 10 million lire,24 payable for certain in a year’s time. How much
would you be prepared to pay (maximum amount) to receive the 10
million immediately?”
q2 = “And if the 10 million lire winnings were available in 2 years’
time, how much would you be prepared to pay (maximum amount)
to receive the 10 million immediately?”
The answers to these questions can be used to calculate (β, δ) in a simple
model of quasi-hyperbolic discounting. In particular, assuming linear utility, we
can estimate the present bias parameter β according to
β =
(10, 000, 000− q1)2
10, 000, 000(10, 000, 000− q2) ,
and classify an individual as a hyperbolic discounter if β < 1, and as an expo-
nential discounter if β ≥ 1.25
The 2000 SHIW also contains a fairly rich set of individual background
variables including some basic information on marital status. In particular,
respondents indicate whether they are married, divorced, single or widowed.
For the purpose of linking present-biasedness to divorce, we restrict our sample
to individuals who, at the time of the survey, were (i) either married or divorced
24As noted by Eisenhauer and Ventura (2006), the 2000 SHIW was conducted before Italy
converted to the Euro and, at the time of the survey, 10 million lire were worth roughly
US$5000.
25Eisenhauer and Ventura (2006) also use this specification to classify individuals as hy-
perbolic or exponential discounters. However, their leading specification takes the case of
logarithmic utility and accounts for preexisting income (y) and wealth (w) by estimating β
according to
β =
[ln(y + w + 10000000 − q1)]2
ln(y +w + 10000000) ln(y +w + 10000000 − q2)
.
The results we present below are qualitatively robust to this alternative characterization of
hyperbolic and exponential discounters.
A1
Table A.1
Present-Biasedness and Divorce
Dependent Variable: Married/Divorced (0/1)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Observations=1,067; Mean Exponential Discounters=0.075
Hyperbolic Discounter 0.042** 0.038* 0.042** 0.040**
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
p-value 0.042 0.054 0.034 0.049
R-squared 0.004 0.113 0.147 0.152
Basic Controls Yes Yes Yes
Regional Controls Yes Yes
Education Yes
Notes: OLS regressions of a dummy for whether an individual is married/divorced (0/1)
on our time-preference indicator and a set of controls. Standard errors reported in paren-
theses. Basic controls include a respondent’s gender and age. Regional controls include
dummy variables for a respondent’s region of residence (20 groups) and the population
density of his or her municipality (4 groups). Education includes dummy variables for a
respondent’s education (6 groups: none, elementary school, middle school, high school,
bachelor’s degree, post-graduate qualification). ∗∗∗ (∗∗) (∗) indicates significance at the
1% (5%) (10%) level.
and (ii) between 25 and 50 years of age.26 Our final sample includes 1,067 survey
respondents. In line with the evidence reported in Eisenhauer and Ventura
(2006), the share of hyperbolic discounters in our sample amounts to 21.6%.
The share of divorced individuals in our sample is 8.4%.
Figure 1 in the main body provides some first evidence on the link between
present-biasedness and divorce. In Table 1, we further explore the evidence in
this figure in a simple regression framework. Specifically, we regress a dummy
D for whether an individual is married (D = 0) or divorced (D = 1) on our
time-preference dummy T indicating whether an individual is an exponential
discounter (T = 0) or a hyperbolic discounter (T = 1). The coefficient in
Column (1) corresponds to the raw gap in means from Figure 1. In Column (2),
we include a respondent’s gender and age as basic controls. In Column (3), we
additionally control for a respondent’s region of residence and the population
density of his or her municipality. Finally, in Column (4), we also control for a
respondent’s education. Throughout all specifications we find that hyperbolic
discounters have significantly higher likelihood to be divorced than exponential
discounters. The point estimates suggest that being a hyperbolic discounter is
26There are two reasons for this age restriction. First, in the 2000 SHIW, there are no
reported cases of divorce among individuals up to an age of 25. Second, individuals older than
50 years at the time of the 2000 SHIW belong to cohorts born prior to 1950. In comparison
to individuals born from the 1950s onwards, these cohorts experienced relatively low rates of
marital instability, which leaves us with very little variation to exploit.
A2
associated with 3.8 to 4.2 percentage points higher divorce rate. Compared to
the divorce rate of 7.5% among exponential discounters, this correspondents to
a 51% to 56% higher divorce incidence.
To check the robustness of this finding, we have also explored surveys that
include qualitative measures of present bias. For example, the Dutch National
Bank (DNB) Household Survey contains a battery of questions of the following
type: Do you only care about the immediate consequences of your actions? Do
you find it more important to do work that gives short-run rather than long-
run results? Which time-horizon do you use in your decision-making? We used
several of this type of questions to construct qualitative measures of present-
biasedness, and mostly found positive correlations between these measures and
the incidence of divorce. The results are available upon request.
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Appendix B: Proofs (Intended for Online Publication)
Proof of Lemma 1
While married, a couple choose their time allocation cooperatively. A conse-
quence of this is that, whatever level of total household production they choose,
their associated time allocation will minimize the cost in terms of foregone earn-
ings. Thus consider the cost minimization problem
C (v) ≡ min
gs,gh
{∑
i
ωigi
∣∣∣∣v (gs, gh) ≥ v
}
, (B1)
where v is the total level of household production. The solution of this problem
has standard properties: the marginal rate of technical substitution is set equal
to the wage ratio, ωs/ωh = vs (gs, gh) /vh (gs, gh), and the marginal cost satisfies
C′ (v) =
ωs
vs (gs, gh)
=
ωh
vh (gs, gh)
. (B2)
Strict concavity of v (·) implies a strictly increasing marginal cost, C′′ (·) > 0.
Consider now the household production problem at t = 2 for a couple that
chose to remain married. Using the cost function, we can focus on the cho-
sen level of production level, denoted vˆm2 , which maximizes the couple’s joint
objective function,
max
vm
2
{
2θ + (1 + β)
[∑
i
ωi + 2 (G
m
1 + v
m
2 )
]
− C (vm2 )
}
. (B3)
and hence satisfies the first order condition,
2 (1 + β)− C′ (vˆm2 ) = 0, (B4)
while the second order condition −C′′ (vm2 ) < 0 is satisfied due to convexity of
the cost function. The first order conditions (11) follow from (B4) and (B2).
After a divorce, the couple no longer choose their time allocation coopera-
tively. However, the assumption on ϕi in (8) implies that the couple’s chosen
time allocation continue to minimize the total cost of their chosen level of pro-
duction, vˆd2 : the individual first order conditions in (13), along with (B2), implies
that vˆd2 satisfies
Λ (1 + β)− C′ (vˆd2) = 0, (B5)
which, together with (B2) and (8), gives the first order condition in (13).
Comparing eqs. (B4) and (B5), and using that C (·) is strictly convex it is
clear that vˆd2 < vˆ
m
2 as Λ < 2. From the cost minimization problem in (B1),
it then also follows that a couple forego more earnings if still married than if
divorced.
Proof of Lemma 2
As the couple is married at t = 1, they choose their time allocation coopera-
tively, thus minimizing the cost of production for their chosen level of household
production. Their joint objective function V1 = Vs1 + Vh1 can then be written
as a choice of Gm1 ,
V1 =
∑
i
ωi + 2G
m
1 − C (Gm1 )
+ β
{(
1− F (θˆ)
) [
2
[∑
i
ωi + 2Gˆ
m
2
]
− C (vˆm2 )
]
(B6)
+2
∫
∞
θˆ
θf(θ)dθ + F (θˆ)
[
2
[∑
i
ωi + ΛGˆ
d
2
]
− C (vˆd2)
]}
,
where θˆ = θˆ(Gm1 ) and Gˆ
k
2 = G
m
1 + vˆ
k
2 with G
m
1 = v (g
m
s1, g
m
h1). The first order
condition characterizing Gˆm1 thus becomes
C′(Gˆm1 ) =2 + 2β
{
2− (2− Λ)F (θˆ)
}
(B7)
+ 2βf(θˆ)θˆ′
{
Cˆ2
2
− 2
[
Gˆm2 −
Λ
2
Gˆd2
]
− θˆ
}
.
We can now substitute for θˆ and θˆ′ using eqs. (16)-(17) and simplify the right
hand side. This gives
C′(Gˆm1 ) = 2 + 2β
{
2− (2− Λ)
[
F (θˆ (vˆm1 ))− χf(θˆ(Gˆm1 ))
]}
, (B8)
with χ defined as in (21). The result then follows immediately from (B2).
Proof of Proposition 1
Part (a) follows immediately from (B4) and (B5) which show that a lower
β implies a lower C′
(
vˆk2
)
and hence a lower level of household production vˆk2
in each marital state k. Thus, more present bias causes a couple to reduce the
level of total household production at t = 2 in both marital states.
To establish part (b), note that, in terms of total household production
levels, the divorce threshold characterized in (16) can be rewritten as
θˆ =
C(vˆm2 )− C(vˆd2)
2
− (1 + β)
[
(Gm1 + vˆ
m
2 )−
Λ
2
(
Gm1 + vˆ
d
2
)]
. (B9)
Differentiating we obtain
∂θˆ
∂β
=
[
(1 + β)
Λ
2
− C
′
(
vˆd2
)
2
]
∂vˆd2
∂β
−
[
(1 + β)− C
′ (vˆm2 )
2
]
∂vˆm2
∂β
(B10)
−
[
(Gm1 + vˆ
m
2 )−
Λ
2
(
Gm1 + vˆ
d
2
)]
.
B2
The first two terms vanish due to eqs. (B4) and (B5), leaving
∂θˆ
∂β
= −
[
(Gm1 + vˆ
m
2 )−
Λ
2
(
Gm1 + vˆ
d
2
)]
< 0, (B11)
where the sign follows from the facts that vˆm2 > vˆ
d
2 (see Lemma 1) and Λ < 2.
Next note that θˆ (Gm1 ) converges to θ˜ (G
m
1 ) as β approaches unity. Since θˆ
additionally decreases with β, any reduction in β away from unity raises the
divorce threshold θˆ (Gm1 ) above θ˜ (G
m
1 ). Present-biased couples therefore divorce
for a larger set of match quality realizations than in the first-best solution.
Proof of Proposition 2
As noted in proof of Lemma 2 the first order condition characterizing the
couple’s choice of first period level of household production satisfies, C′ (vˆm1 ) =
B (vˆm1 ) , where the marginal benefit B (vˆm1 ) is given by the right hand side of
(B8), and with χ defined as in (21). The cost function on the left hand side
does not depend on β but the marginal benefit does. Hence we now characterize
the impact of β on B for a given value of vm1 , noting that this impact can both
be direct (in terms of β appearing directly in B) or via future choices. For
notational convenience, we suppress the arguments of θˆ. We then obtain that
∂B
∂β
=2
{[
2− (2− Λ)
(
F (θˆ)− χf(θˆ)
)]
(B12)
−β(2 − Λ)
[
f(θˆ)
∂θˆ
∂β
−
(
f(θˆ)
∂χ
∂β
+ χf ′(θˆ)
∂θˆ
∂β
)]}
.
We focus on evaluating this expression in the limit where β → 1. This allows
us to consider how the introduction of present bias—i.e, a marginal reduction
in β away from unity—affects B. We first note from eq. (21) that χ = 0 in the
limit where β → 1. Moreover, from eqs. (B11) and (21) it follows that
∂θˆ
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β→1
=
∂χ
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β→1
= −
[
(Gm1 + vˆ
m
2 )−
Λ
2
(
Gm1 + vˆ
d
2
)]
< 0. (B13)
It now follows immediately that,
∂B
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β→1
= 2
[
2− (2− Λ)F (θˆ)
]
> 0. (B14)
Thus, a decrease in β from unity—i.e., the introduction of present bias in cou-
ples’ preferences—reduces the marginal benefits from first-period household pro-
duction. Given the convexity of the cost function C, it thus follows that a couple
that are (marginally) present biased will choose a level of household production
that is below the first best level.
B3
Proof of Corollary 1
Suppose that the total private gains from marriage are drawn from a uniform
probability density function: θ ∼ U(θ, θ). Under this assumption,
F (θˆ) =
θˆ − θ
θ − θ , and χf(θˆ) =
χ
θ − θ . (B15)
Subtracting and using (21) we obtain
F (θˆ)− χf(θˆ) =
ˆˆ
θ − θ
θ − θ , (B16)
where
ˆˆ
θ ≡ C(vˆ
m
2 )− C(vˆd2 )
2
− (1 + β)
(
3− β
2
)[
(vm1 + vˆ
m
2 )−
Λ
2
(
vm1 + vˆ
d
2
)]
. (B17)
The first-order condition characterizing vm1 is as before C
′(vm1 ) = B (vˆm1 ),
where the marginal benefit can now be written as
B (vˆm1 ) = 2 + 2β
[
2− (2− Λ)
(
ˆˆ
θ − θ
θ − θ
)]
. (B18)
Differentiating B with respect to β we obtain
∂B
∂β
= 2
[
2− (2− Λ)
(
ˆˆ
θ − θ
θ − θ
)]
− 2β
(
2− Λ
θ − θ
)
∂
ˆˆ
θ
∂β
. (B19)
To establish the result, we need to show that ∂B/∂β > 0 for any β ∈ (0, 1)
(and for any given value of vm1 ). The first term on the r.h.s. of (B19) is positive.
Thus, a sufficient condition for ∂B/∂β > 0 is that ∂ ˆˆθ/∂β < 0. Differentiating
eq. (B17) with respect to β we obtain,
∂
ˆˆ
θ
∂β
=
[
C′(vˆm2 )
2
− ψ(1 + β)
]
∂vˆm2
∂β
−
[
C′(vˆd2 )
2
− ψ(1 + β)Λ
2
]
∂vˆd2
∂β
− (1− β)
[
(vm1 + vˆ
m
2 )−
Λ
2
(vm1 + vˆ
d
2)
]
, (B20)
where we define ψ ≡ (3 − β)/2 > 1. We can substitute for the marginal cost
using eqs. (B4) and (B5) and also use that these same equations imply that
∂vˆm2
∂β
=
2
C′′(vˆm2 )
and
∂vˆd2
∂β
=
Λ
C′′(vˆd2)
, (B21)
B4
We further restrict our attention to production functions giving rise to a cost
function satisfying C′′′ 6 0.27 Thus,
∂
ˆˆ
θ
∂β
=− (1 + β)(ψ − 1)
2
[
4
C′′(vˆm2 )
− Λ
2
C′′(vˆd2)
]
(B22)
− (1− β)
[
(vm1 + vˆ
m
2 )−
Λ
2
(
vm1 + vˆ
d
2
)]
< 0,
where the sign follows from the facts that vˆm2 > vˆ
d
2 (See Lemma 1) and 2 > Λ.
Thus, if θ is drawn from a uniform probability density function, the couple will
underproduce family-specific capital for any degree of present bias.
Proof of Proposition 3
Note that that the condition that characterizes the first period investment
level G¯m1 by a naive couple can be written as
C′
(
G¯m1
)
= 2 + 2β
[
2− (2− Λ)F (θ˜(G¯m1 ))
]
, (B23)
whereas the condition that characterizes the first period investment level Gˆm1
by a sophisticated couple can be written as in (B8). Since the cost function is
the same, G¯m1 ≥ Gˆm1 if and only if
F (θ˜(G¯m1 )) ≤ F (θˆ(Gˆm1 ))− χf(θˆ(Gˆm1 )), (B24)
where χ is defined as in (21). Then define
κ ≡ χ
θˆ(Gˆm1 )− θ˜(G¯m1 )
. (B25)
Defining also
θˇ (Gm1 ) ≡ Cˆ2/2− 2
[
(Gm1 + vˆ
m
2 )− (Λ/2)
(
Gm1 + vˆ
d
2
)]
, (B26)
it follows that
χ =
(1 + β)
2
[
θˆ(Gˆm1 )− θˇ(Gˆm1 )
]
, (B27)
whereby
κ =
(1 + β)
2
[
θˆ(Gˆm1 )− θˇ(Gˆm1 )
θˆ(Gˆm1 )− θ˜(G¯m1 )
]
. (B28)
But, θˇ(Gˆm1 ) ≃ θ˜
(
G¯m1
)
since both involve exponential discounting only. Hence
G¯m1 ≥ Gˆm1 if and only if
κ
[
θˆ(Gˆm1 )− θ˜(G¯m1 )
]
f(θˆ(Gˆm1 )) ≤ F (θˆ(Gˆm1 ))− F (θ˜(G¯m1 )), (B29)
with κ ≃ (1 + β)/2
27Many commonly used production function yield cost functions that satisfy having C′′′ ≤ 0.
Examples include the Cobb-Douglas functions v(x1, x2) = x
α1
1
x
α2
2
with 1
2
6 α1 + α2 < 1 or
the independent production functions v(x1, x2) = xα1 + x
α
2
with 1
2
6 α < 1.
B5
Proof of Proposition 4
From the perspective of period zero, and for a given divorce cost ζ, the
couple’s joint intertemporal utility, V0 = V0s + V0h, can be written as
V0
β
=
∑
i
ωi + 2vˆ
m
1 − C (vˆm1 ) + 2
∫
∞
θˆ(ζ,vˆm1 (ζ))
θf (θ) dθ (B30)
+
[
1− F (θˆ)
] {
2
[∑
i
ωi + 2 (vˆ
m
1 + vˆ
m
2 )
]
− C (vˆm2 )
}
+ F (θˆ)
{
2
[∑
i
ωi + Λ
(
vˆm1 + vˆ
d
2
)]− ζ − C (vˆd2)} ,
where the divorce threshold that the couple expect themselves to adopt at t = 2
can now be written as
θˆ =
Cˆ2 − ζ
2
− (1 + β)
[
(vˆm1 + vˆ
m
2 )−
Λ
2
(
vˆm1 + vˆ
d
2
)]
. (B31)
Note that we used that the marital status-specific time allocations at t = 2
do not depend on ζ (see 11 and 13), whereas that at t = 1 does: ∂vˆm1 /∂ζ|ζ=0 is
generally non-zero. Indeed we will show below that it is strictly positive for the
case of uniformly distributed match quality shocks. Note also that ζ affects the
divorce threshold both directly and also indirectly via vˆm1 . As we will consider
the incentives to introduce a divorce cost – that is, to increase ζ from zero –
the couple’s behaviour will be evaluated at ζ = 0, thus corresponding to the
laissez-faire equilibrium described above.
Differentiating (B30), evaluating at ζ = 0, and collecting terms gives that
∂V0/∂ζ|ζ=0
β
=(2− C′ (vˆm1 ))
∂vˆm1
∂ζ
∣∣∣∣
ζ=0
(B32)
+ 2f(θˆ)
{
Cˆ2
2
− 2
[
Gˆm2 −
Λ
2
Gˆd2
]
− θˆ
}[
∂θˆ
∂ζ
+
∂θˆ
∂vˆm1
∂vˆm1
∂ζ
]
ζ=0
+ 2
{
2− F (θˆ) (2− Λ)
} ∂vˆm1
∂ζ
∣∣∣∣
ζ=0
− F (θˆ),
where
[
∂θˆ
∂ζ
+ ∂θˆ
∂vˆm
1
∂vˆm
1
∂ζ
]
ζ=0
is the total – direct plus indirect – effect of ζ on θˆ,
evaluated at ζ = 0. Note that, from (B31),
∂θˆ
∂vˆm1
= − (1 + β)
2
(2− Λ) and ∂θˆ
∂ζ
= −1
2
. (B33)
Using this, and also substituting for θˆ using (B31) evaluated at ζ = 0, and using
also the definition of χ in (21) gives
∂V0/∂ζ|ζ=0
β
=
[
2− C′ (vˆm1 ) + 2
{
2− (2− Λ)
[
F (θˆ)− f(θˆ)χ
]}] ∂vˆm1
∂ζ
∣∣∣∣
ζ=0
−
{
F (θˆ)− (1− β) f(θˆ)
[
Gˆm2 −
Λ
2
Gˆd2
]}
. (B34)
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Using then the characterization of the laissez-faire choice of first period invest-
ment in (B8) to substitute for 2− C′ (vˆm1 ) and also using the definition of χ to
substitute in the second term gives
∂V0/∂ζ|ζ=0
β
=
{
2− (2− Λ)
[
F (θˆ)− f(θˆ)χ
]}
2 (1− β) ∂vˆ
m
1
∂ζ
∣∣∣∣
ζ=0
−
[
F (θˆ) − 2
(1 + β)
f(θˆ)χ
]
. (B35)
Note that, in the limit where β → 1, ∂V0/∂ζ|ζ=0 = −βF (θˆ) < 0 (recall
that χ limits to zero as well), implying that if the couple’s present bias is suffi-
ciently small, then they will not benefit from a contracted divorce cost. But for
inframarginal degress of present bias, ∂V0/∂ζ|ζ=0 > 0 if and only if the right
hand side of (B35) is positive. Solving for F (θˆ), this is equivalent to the stated
condition.
We can next readily confirm that vˆm1 is increasing in ζ under the assumption
of uniformly distributed match quality shocks, θ ∼ U (θ, θ). With a divorce cost
ζ > 0, the first order condition characterizing vˆm1 (ζ) can be written as before
as C′ (vˆm1 (ζ)) = B, but where the marginal benefit can now be written as
B =2 + 2β
[
2− (2− Λ)F (θˆ)
]
(B36)
+ 2βf(θˆ)
{
Cˆ2
2
− 2
[
Gˆm2 +
Λ
2
Gˆd2
]
− ζ
2
− θˆ
}
∂θˆ
vˆm1
,
where Gˆk2 = vˆ
m
1 (ζ) + vˆ
k
2 . Consider now the direct effect of ζ on the marginal
benefit B, noting that part of this direct effect is the direct effect on θˆ. In doing
we invoke the uniformity assumption which implies that f (θ) = f = 1/
(
θ − θ)
is constant, and we further note that ∂θˆ/∂vˆm1 is unaffected by ζ (see eq. B33).
Thus we obtain
∂B
∂ζ
= −2β (2− Λ) f ∂θˆ
∂ζ
− 2βf 1
2
∂θˆ
vˆm1
− 2βf ∂θˆ
∂ζ
∂θˆ
vˆm1
. (B37)
Invoking (B33) the last two terms cancel and we obtain that ∂B/∂ζ = 2βf (1− Λ/2) >
0. Since ζ raises the marginal benefit to vˆm1 it follows that, under uniform match
quality shocks, ∂vˆm1 /∂ζ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5
Consider first the couple’s time allocation choice in the second period, start-
ing with a couple that remain married. With a proportional tax τ2 on earnings,
the time allocation choice that maximizes their joint intertemporal utility sat-
isfies
ωi (1− τ2)
vi (gms2, g
m
h2)
= 2 (1 + β) . (B38)
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Contrasting this to the characterization of the first best time allocation in (23),
we see that the efficiency-restoring tax, denoted τˆ2, satisfies
(1 + β)
(1− τˆ2) = 2. (B39)
Solving for τˆ2 gives (30).
In contrast, after a divorce each spouse chooses his or her own time allocation
to maximize the own intertemporal utility. However, as before the assumption
in (8) implies that their choices also maximize the joint utility. Hence the time
allocation choices of a divorced couple satisfies
ωi (1− τ2)
vi (gms2, g
m
h2)
= Λ (1 + β) . (B40)
Contrasting this to the characterization of the first best time allocation in (23),
we see that τˆ2 as defined in (30) restores efficiency of the time allocation also
among divorced couples. With τˆ2 set as in (30), it thus follows that gˆ
m
i2 = g˜
m
i2
and gˆdi2 = g˜
d
i2.
Turning next to the divorce decision, the match quality threshold adopted
by couples under the policy is given by
θˆ =
(1− τˆ2) C˜2 − η
2
− (1 + β)
[
(Gm1 + v˜
m
2 )−
Λ
2
(
Gm1 + v˜
d
2
)]
, (B41)
where we used that τˆ2 induces the first best time allocation in each marital state
(and that the lump-sum policy element α2 does not affect the divorce decision).
Setting this theshold equal to the first best threshold in (24) as solving for the
efficiency-restoring tax ηˆ gives
ηˆ = (1− β)
[
2 (Gm1 + v˜
m
2 )− Λ
(
Gm1 + v˜
d
2
)− 1
2
C˜2
]
, (B42)
where we also made use of the expression for τˆ2 in (30). Note that, unlike τˆ2, ηˆ
generally depends on the capital stock carried forward from the first period, Gm1 .
The first period policy will induce the couple to choose Gm1 = G˜
m
1 ; evaluating
ηˆ at this first period choice, gives the expression for ηˆ in (30).
The lump-sum transfer given to the couple at the outset of the second period
is the expected earnings tax revenue within the period plus the expected divorce
fee:
αˆ2 = τˆ2
[
(1−F (θ˜))
∑
i
[ωi (1− g˜mi2)]+F (θ˜)
∑
i
[
ωi
(
1− g˜di2
)]]
+F (θ˜)ηˆ. (B43)
Consider now the behavior of couples in the first period under policy, and
with the second period policy set as outlined above. The couple’s joint intertem-
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poral utility can then be written as
V1 =
∑
i
ωi (1− τ1) (1− gmi1) + α1 + v (gms1, gmh1)
+ β
{
αˆ2 +
(
1− F (θ˜))[∑
i
ωi [(1− τˆ2) (1− g˜mi2 ) + 1] + 4G˜m2
]
(B44)
+ F (θ˜)
[∑
i
ωi
[
(1− τˆ2)
(
1− g˜di2
)
+ 1
]− ηˆ + 2ΛG˜d2
]
+ 2
∫
∞
θ˜
θf(θ)dθ
}
.
where we used that the second period policy induces first best behaviour. Sub-
stituting in τˆ2, ηˆ and αˆ2, the first-order condition satisfied by the couple’s first
period effort choice reduces to
(1 − τ1)ωi
vi(gˆms1, gˆ
m
h1)
= 2 + 2β
[
2− (2− Λ)F (θ˜)
]
. (B45)
Using the first-order condition for the first-best solution [eq. (25)], the efficiency-
restoring first-period earnings tax rate satisfies
2 + 2β
[
2− (2− Λ)F (θ˜)
]
1− τˆ1 = 6− 2 (2− Λ)F (θ˜). (B46)
Solving for τˆ1 gives the expression in (31). The first period lump sum transfer
αˆ1 finally is simply the first period earnings by the couply given that tax rate τˆ1
and the fact that they, under the policy, chooses the efficient first period time
allocation.
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Appendix D: A Calibrated Model (Intended for Online Publication)
In this Appendix, we extend the model to a T -period setting which we
calibrate to the US economy. Doing so allows for a richer set of family paths
and enables us to address key quantitative questions: what impact does an
empirically relevant level of present bias have on family behavior and outcomes?
And what structure and level of policy is required to restore efficiency?
The family-specific capital enjoyed in period t is, as before, Gt + υ (gst, ght)
where Gt is the amount of capital carried forward from the previous period. We
now also allow for capital depreciation by setting
Gt = γ [Gt−1 + υ (gs,t−1, gh,t−1)] , (C1)
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the capital carry-forward rate. In line with our interpretation
of the capital good as investments in children, we assume that the investment
process terminates at some T0 < T . In each period, a couple experience a match
quality shock θt, which is i.i.d. across periods and drawn from a distribution
F (·). An adverse temporary shock may induce a couple to divorce and if they
do so they remain divorced forever. Thus, there will be couples who find them-
selves divorced but still making investments and, conversely, couples who find
themselves still married but with no further investments to make. We will focus
on sophisticated behaviour.
The efficiency-restoring policy will involve (i) an earnings tax τkt which gen-
erally varies with marital status, k = m, d, and marriage duration t ≤ T0, and
(ii) a divorce tax ηt that also varies with duration t ≤ T .28
The post-divorce earnings tax has a simple analytical solution:
τˆdt = (1− β)
∑T−t
n=1 (δγ)
n
1 +
∑T−t
n=1 (δγ)
n
for t ≤ T0, (C2)
which generalizes eq. (30). This shows that the earnings tax, at any duration
t (within the investment phase), is proportional to the degree of present bias.
It also varies with t as a longer marriage duration implies a shorter remaining
horizon. However, given that there are several post-investment periods the ratio
on the right hand side of eq. (C2) will be close to δγ for any investment period
t ≤ T0. Hence while τˆdt is decreasing over time due to the horizon effect, it is, for
reasonable δ and γ, very close to δγ (1− β) throughout a couple’s investment
phase.
A similar expression, though somewhat more involved, can be provided for
the earnings tax facing married couples:
τˆmt = (1− β)
γδV˜ ′t+1
2 + γδV ′t+1
for t ≤ T0, (C3)
28No earnings tax is imposed at t > T0 since there are no time-allocation decisions to be
made once the investment process has terminated. The divorce tax however is applicable
across all periods. As in the three-period model, the efficiency-restoring policy also involves a
transfer to each couple at the beginning of each period that corresponds to the expected total
tax paid in that period.
C1
where
V˜ ′t =
T−t∑
n=0
(δγ)
n

2
n∏
j=0
[
1− F (θ˜t+j)
]
+ Λ

1− n∏
j=0
[
1− F (θ˜t+j)
]

 , (C4)
with θ˜t+j = θ˜t+j(G˜t+j), captures the joint marginal value of capital, in the
efficient allocation, to a couple entering period t as married.29 This generalizes
both eq. (31) and eq. (30) in the three-period model. It is straightforward to
show that τˆmt ≤ τˆdt , with the difference obtaining from the fact that Λ < 2 and
positive future divorce risk. In particular, if either (i) Λ→ 2, or (ii) at t, there
was no future divorce risk, then the earnings tax at t would coincide across
marital status.30 When we calibrate the model we obtain that Λ/2 ≥ 0.9 (see
below). From this it follows that the difference between τˆmt and τˆ
d
t will be fairly
small, and both will be close to (1− β) γδ throughout the couple’s investment
phase.
We assume a normal distribution for the match quality shocks, θt ∼ N (µθ, σθ),
and a simple additively separable iso-elastic specification for the household pro-
duction function,
υ (gst, ght) = ag
b
st + ag
b
ht, (C5)
where a, b > 0. We set T = 40, thus effectively capturing the time from the
median age at first marriage until retirement age.31,32 A number of parameters
are set based on the literature, including β and δ. For the latter, a large macro
literature, following Prescott (1986), have argued that a reasonable range for
the annual discount rates is 2-7 percent so we fix a value in the middle of this
range, δ = 0.95. For β there have been recent findings of little or no present
bias in experiments with monetary payments (e.g., Andreoni and Sprenger,
2012), but clear present bias in the experiments based on real effort tasks (Au-
genblick, Niederle and Sprenger, 2013). Furthermore, it is not clear whether
joint decision-making by couples or other groups of individuals are more or less
time-consistent than is individual decision-making (Jackson and Yariv, 2015).
Contrasting choices made separately and jointly, Carlsson and Yang (2013) find
no evidence that married couples behave systematically more time-consistent
when making joint decisions than when making individual ones. The estimates
of Augenblick, Niederle and Sprenger (2013) suggest values of β of around 0.9,
29Intuitively, an extra unit of capital increases a couple’s joint utility by 2 in any remaining
period in which the couple are still married and by Λ in any period in which they are divorced.
The expression captures this while accounting also for discounting and capital depreciation.
30This explains why, in the three period model, we obtained that τˆm
2
= τˆd
2
as we assumed
zero divorce risk at t = 3.
31The median age at first marriage, according to the latest US Census Bureau, stands at
27.1 for women and 29.2 for men.
32We include a further 10 “retirement” periods during which a couple cannot divorce. The
purpose of this is to prevent a sharp increase in the divorce hazard for a couple that approach
T . Indeed, otherwise the future component of the gain to marriage would become quickly
dominated by the match quality shocks.
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Table C.1: Baseline Calibration of the Extended Dynamic Model
Parameter/Stylized Fact Value Source
δ Annual discount date 0.95 Literature
β Present-bias factor 0.95 Literature
ωh Male wage rate 1.00 Normalized
ωs Female wage rate 0.82 BLS
γ Capital carry-forward rate 0.975 Literature
a Investment efficiency 0.042 Matched
b Investment elasticity 0.70 Matched
λs Female post-divorce utility 1 Fixed
λh Male post-divorce utility 0.84 Matched
µθ Match quality location -0.01 Matched
σθ Match quality spread 0.90 Matched
Marriage survival at 10 years 0.68 NCHS
“Empty nest” divorce effect 0.75 Literature
Married males’ labour market time 0.67 BLS, ATUS
Married females’ labour market time 0.36 BLS, ATUS
Maximum impact divorce at 10 years 0.15 Literature
which would seem like a natural lower bound for the current exercise and hence
we impose a conservative value of β = 0.95.
We set the length of the investment phase T0 to 20 years, corresponding to
the average school leaving age in the US (OECD, 2008). The “gender pay gap”
is generally defined as the ratio of female to male median yearly earnings among
full-time, year-round workers. In 2013, the female-to-male earnings ratio was
82 percent (BLS, 2014). Hence we normalize the male wage to unity, wh = 1,
and set the female wage to ws = 0.82. Based on the literature, we set a modest
degree of human capital depreciation, γ = 0.975 (Manuelli, Seshadri and Shin,
2012). We further assume a wife continues to fully enjoy the family-specific
capital post divorce, λs = 1, but not the husband.
We calibrate the remaining parameters: the household production technol-
ogy parameters a and b, the location and spread of the distribution of match
quality shocks µθ and σθ, and the husband’s post-divorce enjoyment of the cap-
ital good, λh. To do so we use empirical stylized facts on how couples with
children allocate their time, on marriage survival rates, on the impact divorce
have on kids’ outcomes, and on the impact of children leaving on the divorce
risk.
Combining data on labor force participation from the U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics with time use data from the American Time Use Survey, we use as
a stylized fact that married women and men with children in the household
spend on average 64 percent and 33 percent of (non-leisure) time on household
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work respectively.33 Turning to marriage survival rates, in the latest figures, the
probability of a first marriage being intact after 10 years is 0.68.34 The literature
has also noted an “empty nest effect”, i.e., an increase in the divorce risk when
children leave the parental home. Hiedemann, Suhomlinova and O’Rand (1998)
find that the empty nest effect increases the divorce hazard by 50 - 200 percent.
Walker and Zhu (2004) find an effect at the lower end of this range for the UK.
In our calibrated model, the divorce hazard is at its lowest when the kids are in
their early teens, and we calibrate the model so that it generates an increase in
the hazard of 75 percent from this point to two years after the termination of
investments.
The most controversial stylized fact is the impact of divorce on kids’ out-
comes, represented in the model by the accumulated family capital. While there
is a strong negative empirical association between divorce and children’s out-
comes, establishing the causal effect of divorce on kids outcomes has proven
more difficult. Our reading of the literature is that the causal effects are overall
limited in size, especially for kids who are older when the divorce occurs.35 This
effectively puts a lower bound on λm. In order to capture this in our calibrated
model, we compare the capital stock, ten years post-divorce, for divorcing cou-
ples relative to couples who remain intact (by duration at divorce), and cap the
negative effect of divorce at 15 percent. The final set of calibrated parameter
values are shown in Table C.1. The top panel gives the parameter values im-
posed based on the literature. The middle panel gives the parameter values that
were obtained by matching the model to the stylized facts listed in the bottom
panel.
In Figure C.1, we consider the impact of present bias on marital outcomes.
The left panel shows the fraction of couples still married by years since marriage.
In addition to the matched fraction at 10 years since marriage (highlighted with
a red marker), the model also closely matches the median marriage duration of
20 years. The figure highlights that even a modest degree of present bias can
lead to significant over-divorcing. For example, at durations between 10 and 30
years since marriage, the fraction of couples that have divorced in the laissez-
faire allocation is 30-40 percent larger than in the efficient allocation. The
extent of overdivorcing also becomes apparent in the right panel which shows
the equilibrium divorce hazard by marriage duration. The divorce hazard is
naturally U-shaped: it decreases as family capital is gradually accumulated,
but then increases again due to the shortening of the remaining time horizon
and the gradual depreciation of the capital stock. It is thus at its lowest when
33BLS Report 1052 (2014, Tables 5, 6 and 21) give fraction of married women with children
under the age of 18 who were in the labor force and the fraction working full time, along with
the fraction of men who are in the labor force. Table A-6 from BLS ATUS statistics gives time
spent in primary activities by mothers and fathers during the period 2009-2013 by gender and
labour force status.
34See Copen et al. (2012)
35For example, see Gruber (2004), Piketty (2003), Bjo¨rklund and Sundstro¨m (2006) and
Francesconi et al. (2010).
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Figure C.1: Marriage survival rate and divorce hazard by marriage duration
the kids are in their teens, and at this stage the divorce hazard under present
bias is about double the efficient hazard.36
In Figure C.2, we present our results for the time allocation choices by
females and males over their investment phase. The two top panels compare
the laissez-faire equilibrium with the efficient allocation. In general, the effect of
present bias on couples’ time allocation choices is quantitatively smaller than its
impact on divorce decisions. In particular, a present bias reduces both female
and male household time by roughly 15-17 percent as compared to the first-best,
with relatively little variation by marriage duration. The bottom panel shows
how divorced couples devote less time to household production. In proportional
terms, divorced couples, both men and women, tend to devote about 20 percent
less time to household production relative to married couples.
In Figure C.3, we focus our attention on how the stock of family-specific
capital evolves with marriage duration. The left panel shows how the average
capital stock in the present-biased equilibrium is lower than in the efficient
allocation. Note that this is a combination of more couples being divorced and
36The red markers highlight the increase in the divorce hazard from when the child is aged
13 to aged 22 which was match to 75 percent.
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Figure C.2: Fraction of time devoted to household production by marriage duration.
0 10 20 30 40
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Average Capital Stock
 
 
Eq. Allocation
Eff. Allocation
0 10 20 30
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
1.05
Impact of Divorce 10 Years Later
 
 
Eq. Allocation
Eff. Allocation
Figure C.3: Average accumulated capital stock and impact of divorce on accumulated capital
10 years on by marriage duration
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lower investments in each marital state. At any duration, the average capital
stock accumulated by a present-biased couple is about 11 percent below the
average capital stock they would have had in the efficient allocation. The right
panel illustrates the capital stock at 10 year post divorce for couples who divorce
at time t relative to the corresponding capital stock for couples who are still
intact at t+10. Naturally the impact of divorce is larger the earlier it occurs. As
noted above, we have calibrated the model so that this impact of divorce does
not exceed 15 percent (highlighted by the red marker). Interestingly, present
bias does not exacerbate the negative impact of divorce.
In Figure 3 in the main text, we turn to the efficiency-restoring policy in the
calibrated model. The left panel shows the optimal earnings tax for married
and divorced couples by years since marriage. As noted above, τˆmt < τˆ
d
t and
both are decreasing over time. In addition, both are quantitatively very close
to (1− β) γδ (highlighted by the horizontal red line). More interesting is the
efficiency-restoring divorce tax shown in the right panel. This is inverted U-
shaped and is largest during children’s early teenage years, i.e., when the gap
between the laissez-fair and the efficient divorce hazard is at its largest. In
quantitative terms, the maximum optimal divorce tax of 0.095 corresponds to
roughly 10 percent of the annual earnings of a married couple during their
investment phase. In contrast, the optimal divorce tax for couples who are well
past their investment phase is relatively minor.
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Appendix D: Non-Cooperative Behavior (Intended for Online Publi-
cation)
In this appendix, we replace the assumption of cooperative behavior in mar-
riage with non-cooperative Nash equilibrium behavior. We focus on the simplest
case with pure non-altruistic preferences. In this context it is also natural to
focus on the case in which there are no income transfers between the partner,
neither in marriage nor after divorce. Hence in this version of the model, each
partner always consumes his or her own earnings. Throughout, we set δ = 1.
8.1. Laissez-Faire
As no decisions are taken in the final period, individual utilities are un-
changed from the main model. In period 2, conditional on continued marriage,
individual utilities are as before and each spouse now maximize his/her own
utility only. Hence the second-period time allocations in marriage are now
characterized by the following first order conditions,
ωj
υi (gˆms2, gˆ
m
h2)
= 1 + β, for i = s, h, (D1)
which hold simultaneously in equilibrium.
In the divorced state—and assuming no income transfers—a corresponding
characterization applies except that spouse i now only enjoys the family capital
good at rate λi. Hence the second-period time allocations in the divorced state
are characterized by
ωi
υi
(
gˆds2, gˆ
d
h2
) = λi (1 + β) , for i = s, h, (D2)
holding simultaneously. As we assume that λi ≤ 1 for both spouses with at
least one inequality, weak strategic complementarity between the two inputs is
sufficient to ensure that neither spouse invests more in divorce than in marriage.
We can now consider the divorce decision. Letting Gˆk2 = G
m
1 + υ
(
gˆks2, gˆ
k
h2
)
denote the laissez-faire equilibrium level of the capital stock at time t = 2 in
marital state k it follows that spouse i will prefer continued marriage if and only
if
θ ≥ θˆi (Gm1 ) ≡ ωi
(
gˆmi2 − gˆdi2
)− (1 + β)(Gˆm2 − λiGˆd2) . (D3)
Note the θˆi (G
m
1 ) generally differ across the spouses. Assuming a unilateral
divorce regime, divorce occurs if θ falls below either of the two θˆi (G
m
1 ). Hence
define
θˆ (Gm1 ) = max
i=s,h
{
θˆi (G
m
1 )
}
, (D4)
for the couple and let i∗ (Gm1 ) denote the “decisive spouse” – that is, the spouse
with the higher critical match quality (given Gm1 ). It then follows that
θˆ′ (Gm1 ) = θˆ
′
i∗ (G
m
1 ) = − (1 + β) (1− λi∗) ≤ 0. (D5)
D1
Turning to the initial period, the first order condition characterizing the time
allocation of spouse i = s, h can be written as
ωi
υi (gˆms1, gˆ
m
h1)
= 1 + 2β
[
1− F
(
θˆ
)
(1− λi)
]
+βf
(
θˆ
)
θˆ′ (Gm1 )× (D6)[
ωi
(
gˆmi2 − gˆdi2
)− 2(Gˆm2 − λiGˆd2) − θˆ (Gm1 )] .
Of course, in the Nash equilibrium (D6) holds simultaneously for the two spouses.
For the decisive spouse i∗ this can be simplified, as in the main model, by
substituting for θˆ (Gm1 ) and θˆ
′ (Gm1 ) to obtain that
ωi∗
υi∗ (gˆms1, gˆ
m
h1)
= 1 + 2β
{
1− (1− λi∗)
[
F
(
θˆ
)
− f
(
θˆ
)
χ
]}
, (D7)
where
χ ≡
(
1− β2) [Gˆm2 − λi∗Gˆd2]
2
> 0, (D8)
captures the strategic investment incentives. The corresponding condition for
the non-decisive spouse does not simplify as easily. We therefore consider two
special cases.
Case 1: A Custodial Spouse who is also Decisive.
Suppose that λi∗ = 1 and λ−i∗ < 1. In keeping with the interpretation
of the family capital good as investments in children will refer to the former
spouse as “custodial”. Note from (D3) that a spouse who loses relatively less
of the enjoyment of the family capital good at divorce tends to have a weaker
incentives to remain married, but investment differences – across the spouses
and across marital states – implies that it is not guaranteed that the spouse
with the higher λ is also decisive. Hence we adopt that as an assumption here.
When the decisive spouse is also custodial, we see from (D5) that θˆ′ (Gm1 ) = 0
whereby it follows that the strategic investment incentives vanishes for both
partners, leading to the reduced characterization of the first period investments,
ωi
υi (gˆms1, gˆ
m
h1)
= 1 + 2β
[
1− F
(
θˆ
)
(1− λi)
]
, for i = s, h, (D9)
where we also note that the square bracket further reduces to unity for the
custodial spouse.
Case 2: Shared Custody
Suppose that λs = λh = λ < 1. Moreover, assume that
ωs
(
gˆms2 − gˆds2
)− ωh (gˆmh2 − gˆdh2) = 0. (D10)
This is an assumption on endogenous variables, but could be guaranteed by
assuming complete symmetry across the partners in terms of wages and the
investment technology. We highlight (D10) here to show that this is exactly
D2
the condition that implies symmetry across the partners. First note that, with
shared custody and using (D10), we see from (D4) that both spouses agree on
the divorce decision. In this case, the strategic investment incentive is present,
but is symmetric across the spouses. In particular, the first period investments
are characterized by
ωi
υi (gˆms1, gˆ
m
h1)
= 1 + 2β
{
1− (1− λ)
[
F
(
θˆ
)
− f
(
θˆ
)
χ
]}
, for i = s, h. (D11)
8.2. Efficiency-Restoring Policy
The characterization of the first best allocation is unchanged from the main
model. Consider then the efficiency-restoring earnings tax at t = 2 in the
married state. This tax now becomes
τˆm2 =
3− β
4
. (D12)
Note that in the limiting case of no present-bias this reduces to τˆm2 = 1/2 which
is now required in order to internalize the externality generated as each partner
fails to take into account the benefit of the own investment to the spouse.
In the divorced state the efficiency-restoring earnings tax for spouse i be-
comes
τˆdi2 =
Λ (1− β) + (1 + β) λ−i
2Λ
, i = s, h. (D13)
Unlike the tax in the married state, this tax is generally not gender-neutral,
except in the case where there is equal custody, λs = λh, in which case the
tax is not only gender-neutral but also invariant to marital status, τˆdi2 = τˆ
m
2
for i = s, h. Also, in the limiting case of no present-bias, the tax on spouse i
reduces to τˆdi2 = λ−i/Λ. Hence the efficiency-restoring tax is naturally higher
on the spouse with the relatively lower post-divorce enjoyment of the family
capital good.
The efficiency-restoring divorce fee (levied in equal shares on the two part-
ners) in the general case satisfies
ωi∗
[
g˜mi∗2 (1− τˆm2 )− g˜di∗2
(
1− τˆdi∗2
)]− ηˆ
2
− (1 + β)
(
G˜m2 − λi∗G˜d2
)
=
1
2
∑
i=s,h
ωi
(
g˜mi2 − g˜di2
)− 2(G˜m2 − Λ2 G˜d2
)
(D14)
where, as before, i∗ = i∗ (Gm1 ) indicates the identity of the decisive spouse. In
Special Case 2 with equal shared custody and with (D10) assumed to hold also
at the first best allocation, the efficient divorce fee reduces to
ηˆ = (1− β)
(
2G˜m2 − ΛG˜d2
)
− τˆm2 C˜2, (D15)
which directly corresponds to the efficiency-restoring divorce fee in the main
model, except for the fact that τˆm2 now also corrects for the externality generated
by the spouses’ investments.
D3
The efficiency-restoring first period earnings tax is in general quite involved
so we will focus here on the two special cases outlined above. Consider first the
case of a custodial spouse who is also decisive, λi∗ = 1 and λ−i∗ < 1. In this
case the efficiency restoring tax for spouse i satisfies
1− τˆi1 =
1 + 2β
[
1− F
(
θ˜
)
(1− λi)
]
6− 2 (2− Λ)F
(
θ˜
) , (D16)
whereby it follows that the tax should be higher on the non-custodial spouse
than on the custodial spouse for reasons similar to above. In the second special
case where custody is equally shared and (D10) holds the efficiency restoring
tax is again gender neutral and satisfies
τˆ1 =
1 + 2 (2− β)
[
1− (1− λ)F
(
θ˜
)]
6− 4 (1− λ)F
(
θ˜
) . (D17)
As expected, in the limit with no present bias the tax reduces τˆ1 = 1/2.
D4
